A Dangerous Year for Taiwan: Converging Pressures Raise the Risk of Chinese Invasion

 

Multiple political, strategic, and military factors are converging in a way that could make 2026 a uniquely dangerous year for Taiwan. Chinese leaders increasingly believe that asserting control over Taiwan is inevitable and may be achievable sooner than previously assumed.

Xi Jinping’s personal ambitions and political timeline add urgency to this assessment. He has pushed the Taiwan issue more aggressively than any predecessor and may view reunification as a defining legacy achievement. Xi has set 2027 as the target for the People’s Liberation Army to complete its modernization goals, ordering the military to be capable of a successful invasion by the PLA’s 100th anniversary.

While 2027 itself is unlikely to see major military action due to the Communist Party Congress and the regime’s emphasis on internal stability, the year immediately preceding it, 2026, is far more flexible.

Former INDOPACOM commander Admiral Philip Davidson warned in 2021 that the threat to Taiwan would become “manifest” within six years, a warning that came to be known as the Davidson Window. The term refers to a period of heightened risk, roughly between 2021 and 2027, during which China could acquire the military capability to attempt a takeover of Taiwan.

Davidson’s testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee underscored the pace of China’s military modernization and its narrowing gap with U.S. and allied forces in the region.

According to 2025 and 2026 U.S. Department of Defense reports, the People’s Liberation Army has expanded its missile inventory from about 1,200 in 2020 to roughly 3,500, while missile launchers grew from 800 to 1,500, supported by additional brigades and 300 new ICBM silos. Systems such as the DF-26 enable saturation strikes on U.S. bases in Guam.

China has also added a third aircraft carrier, expanded its amphibious fleet, and adapted commercial vessels for large-scale military transport across the Taiwan Strait.

Military analysts identify 2026 as a period of offensive overmatch for China, as Taiwan shifts toward an asymmetric defense model before fully integrating key U.S.-supplied systems. Deliveries of 100 Harpoon coastal defense sets and 66 F-16V fighters have begun, but training and integration will not be complete until 2027 or 2028, while HIMARS and the Haikun-class submarine remain in early fielding stages.

China’s 2025 defense budget reached $247 billion, compared with Taiwan’s $31 billion in 2026, even after a 16 percent increase. Although Taiwan approved an additional $40 billion defense package for 2026 to 2033, the PLA’s more than two million active personnel dwarf Taiwan’s 170,000, a gap Taiwan cannot close without external support.

Beijing’s calculations hinge on whether the United States would intervene. Muted responses to Chinese military exercises and a broader U.S. focus elsewhere reinforce the perception that Washington may be less willing or less able to defend Taiwan.  Analysts argue 2026 may present a narrow window during U.S. midterm elections, when political disruption could delay decision-making.

Taiwan’s internal political weakness further feeds Beijing’s confidence. Since the 2024 elections, President Lai Ching-te lacks a legislative majority, and the opposition coalition has blocked key initiatives, including the special defense budget that has been stalled multiple times as of January 2026.

The opposition has also passed measures expanding legislative oversight and restructuring the Constitutional Court, effectively freezing its ability to rule on the constitutionality of new laws and creating a standoff between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.

With Taiwan’s local elections scheduled for late 2026, Beijing is likely to intensify gray-zone pressure to influence public sentiment and test the government’s resolve. Declining support for the ruling party and its leader is viewed in Beijing as evidence that resistance to unification is weakening. If U.S. intervention is deemed unlikely and economic retaliation manageable, the cost-benefit analysis shifts sharply in favor of action.

Admiral Paparo is warning that China can use military “exercises” as cover for real war preparations. By calling large-scale movements an exercise, Beijing can move forces, test command and control, and position assets in ways that look routine. This makes it difficult for intelligence agencies to tell the difference between training and the early stages of an actual operation.

China has been increasingly treating the Taiwan Strait as its internal waters, and by 2026, the frequency of these drills is expected to reach a point where they can be converted into a functional blockade or quarantine with almost no warning, forcing the U.S. and its allies into a difficult decision to escalate to break the blockade or accept a new normal.

Taiwan faces a demographic tipping point in 2026 when it officially becomes a super-aged society, meaning over 20 percent of the population is 65 or older. The shrinking pool of young people is directly impacting defense, and despite returning to a one-year conscription period, the military struggles to find enough able-bodied recruits. As the population ages, the government faces massive pressure to pivot funds from the defense budget toward long-term care and pension subsidies.

Taiwan’s energy policy is perhaps its greatest vulnerability. To meet net zero goals, Taiwan has aggressively phased out coal and nuclear power, leaving it heavily dependent on Liquefied Natural Gas. Taiwan currently holds only about 11 to 14 days of LNG reserves, meaning in a conflict or blockade, the power grid could collapse in less than two weeks.

Taiwan’s massive semiconductor and AI industry requires immense amounts of electricity, creating fierce internal debates over whether to restart nuclear plants to ensure the silicon shield stays powered.

While 2026 is high-risk, analysts at ASPI and other institutes argue that China’s own economic headwinds, including slowing growth and high youth unemployment, might actually deter Xi from a high-stakes war that could trigger global sanctions, adding to economic pressures.

In conclusion, a convergence of external and internal factors suggests that 2026, during the U.S. midterm elections, could present China with an opportunity to act. At the same time, several constraints indicate the situation may remain unchanged for the foreseeable future. It is also possible that Xi Jinping will delay any move until President Trump leaves office. Russia chose the Obama and Biden administrations for its actions in Ukraine, and Hamas attacked Israel under Biden.

By contrast, Trump’s decision to order the military to seize Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, combined with strikes on Venezuelan drug boats and on Iran, may serve as a deterrent. Beijing may therefore conclude that waiting to see the direction of the next U.S. administration is the safer course.

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