Europe’s Defense Reality Check: The Mathematics of Military Inadequacy
Following President Trump’s successful push for NATO allies to commit to spending 5% of GDP on defense by 2035, Europe now faces the potentially insurmountable challenge of reversing decades of military neglect. Building a force capable of defending the continent against Russia or China will be a massive undertaking, made even more difficult by declining birthrates, a shrinking workforce, and the political cost of maintaining generous welfare states and pacifist norms.
NATO allies agreed on June 25, 2025, to more than double their defense spending target from 2% of GDP to 5% by 2035, with the commitment structured as 3.5% for “core defense” and 1.5% for broader security measures including infrastructure and cyber defense. This achievement was widely praised, with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stating: “Would you ever think that this would be the result of this summit if he would not have been re-elected president? … I think he deserves all the praise”. However, the magnitude of this commitment becomes clear when examining current spending levels and capability gaps.
In 2024, European NATO members spent a combined $454 billion on defense, just 30% of total NATO spending, while the United States spent $997 billion, or 66%. Reports claim European military spending rose by 17% to $693 billion in 2024, but that figure misleadingly includes Russia’s estimated $149 billion. Given that NATO exists primarily to deter Russian aggression, it is absurd to include Russia’s defense budget in Europe’s total.
Even in terms of GDP percentage, Russia continues to outpace the European Union in defense spending. The EU’s total defense spending is projected to reach around 2.04% of GDP in 2025, while Russia is expected to spend 7.5% of its GDP on the military. But the gap in spending is just one part of Europe’s broader capabilities deficit.
Unlike Russia or the United States, Europe’s $454 billion in defense expenditures is fragmented across more than 30 countries, each with its own command structure, procurement system, administrative overhead, and military bureaucracy. In contrast, the United States achieves far greater efficiency and combat power through its unified $997 billion defense budget, which supports a single military structure with global reach.
Because the United States has invested in defense every single year since World War II, American military spending builds upon a solid, established foundation of infrastructure, technology, and institutional knowledge. In contrast, many European countries have militaries that are only 30 years old, particularly those that emerged from Soviet control, while even longstanding NATO members spent so little on defense for decades that their current spending represents desperate catch-up efforts.
Meanwhile, Europe remains fundamentally dependent on the United States for essential military functions including satellite intelligence services, threat assessments, air-to-air refueling, ballistic missile defense, airborne electromagnetic warfare, and advanced surveillance capabilities. These sophisticated systems cannot be quickly replicated regardless of increased spending, as they represent decades of technological development and operational expertise.
By some estimates, Europe would have to increase its annual spending by an additional $270 billion just to approach parity with Russia. More critically, Russia benefits from decades of accumulated military stockpiles inherited from the Soviet-era assets that took generations to build and cannot be quickly replicated. Its defense industry employs 4.5 million people and produces weapons at nearly three times the rate of the U.S. and Europe combined, while European nations are still operating largely peacetime defense industries.
Matching Russia’s military spending, which equals 32% of its government budget, would devastate Europe’s social welfare systems. European countries currently devote an average of 19.5% of GDP to social benefits, including healthcare, pensions, unemployment, and education, with France spending as much as 31.3%. Raising defense budgets to Russian levels would require deep cuts to the very programs that define European societies: universal healthcare, generous unemployment benefits, extensive parental leave, free higher education, and comprehensive pensions.
Beyond spending, Europe would face serious manpower challenges in expanding its armies. All European countries have fallen below the population replacement rate of 2.1 births per woman. Some of the lowest fertility rates include Malta (1.06), Spain (1.12), Lithuania (1.18), and Italy (1.21). Since World War II, most have reduced or eliminated conscription, France ended it in 1996, Spain in 2001, Germany in 2011, Belgium in 1994, and the UK as early as 1963.
Today, only a few countries, such as Finland, Norway, Cyprus, Austria, Lithuania, Estonia, and Switzerland, retain some form of conscription, typically with short terms and limited enforcement. In contrast, Russia maintains mandatory conscription for men up to age 30.
Falling birthrates and an aging population leave Europe with a shrinking workforce, rising pension costs, and limited fiscal space for defense or modernization. Sustaining expansive welfare systems while building credible military power is likely mathematically unworkable. With constrained tax capacity, demographic decline, and growing threats from Russia and China, Europe faces a narrowing set of options.
Conscription alone won’t solve the manpower shortage. Defense spending would also need to rise significantly, requiring major restructuring and politically painful cuts to entrenched social programs. Europe can either maintain generous welfare and remain militarily dependent on the U.S., or redirect resources toward serious defense investment at the expense of its social model.
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